ABOUT
FSG-A

Purpose

Sweden and its allies need an open, technically rigorous discussion of drone warfare at the engineering level — not a closed procurement-driven dialogue between a small number of primes and a single armed-forces customer. FSG-A fills that gap. The material is designed to raise the technical floor for everyone who touches this domain: Försvarsmakten planners evaluating concepts, industry engineers designing subsystems, reservist battalions experimenting with field kits, university research groups, NGO aid workers supplying Ukrainian brigades, and journalists or policy analysts trying to understand what the debate is actually about.

Nothing on this site is official doctrine of any armed force, including the Swedish Armed Forces. Nothing here is a product offering, a vendor pitch, or a consulting proposal. It is a reference architecture — Lisa 26, Fischer 26, the Norrbotten protocol, the C-UAS vehicle upgrades — published openly so that anyone serious about this problem space can build from a shared foundation instead of reinventing it.

FSG-A generates ideas, not products

Everything produced under the FSG-A label — the Lisa 26 AI decision engine, the Fischer 26 ISR/EW airframe family, the antenna cluster architecture, the CPFH cost model, the Ukraine-as-innovation-hub doctrine, the 73 executable proofs in provable_claims.py, the 8 formal reference-design PDFs — is intended to be forked, adapted, and built on by others. FSG-A does not ship products. We ship ideas in a form that can be verified and extended.

Lisa 26 is the clearest example. It is a reference implementation of functions a brigade-level AI decision layer should provide. FMV has already procured the real system — GUTE II, contracted 2026-04-02, Saab-led, SEK 8.7 billion, deliveries 2027–2028. Lisa 26 is not a competing product; it is a runnable demonstration of what "AI-assisted threat fusion with L1/L2/L3 authority" means concretely, so the people building GUTE II's actual decision layer have a reference to measure against. When GUTE II is fully operational, Lisa 26's role as an idea source is complete. That is by design.

The same logic applies across the wiki. The Fischer 26 airframe family demonstrates what sub-€2,000 ISR/EW drones can do in 2026 terms, so that procurement programmes deciding between a €15,000 MIL-qualified airframe and a €1,500 Tier A equivalent have an honest reference. The formal documentation suite demonstrates what a full acquisition programme's FMEA, TEMP, ILS, and Safety Case should contain, so that actual programmes have templates rather than starting from scratch. The wiki is a toolbox — every tool is designed to be picked up by someone building the real thing.

Organisation

FSG-A is not a company, defence contractor, or consulting firm. It is a network of Swedish nationals with operational experience from Ukraine who contribute to an open-source technical knowledge base on military drone systems. The publishing entity is Fischer Ventures EOOD (UIC 206683576, Varna, Bulgaria), which exists only for administrative purposes (domain registration, invoicing for hosting, legal contact point). There is no licensing model, consulting fee, maintenance contract, or commercial interest — in Swedish Armed Forces procurement or anywhere else.

Lisa 26, Fischer 26, and all documentation are published under CC BY-SA 4.0. Any organisation — Swedish Armed Forces, FOI, FMV, NATO allies, industry integrators, reservist units, universities, NGOs supporting Ukrainian forces, or anyone else — may use, modify, translate, classify, or deploy the material without permission or payment. The only obligation under CC BY-SA 4.0 is attribution and share-alike if the work is redistributed.

Scope and Methodology

The wiki covers military drone technology from component level to brigade-level AI decision support across 8 knowledge clusters: FPV construction, autonomous systems, electronic warfare, arctic operations, vehicle counter-UAS, fiber-optic countermeasures, Lisa 26 brigade AI system, and Fischer 26 ISR platform. 300+ pages in three languages (English, Swedish, Ukrainian). Every hardware recommendation includes EUR pricing from European suppliers. Every ArduPilot parameter is traceable to the official ArduPilot documentation. Every mathematical formula is independently testable via python3 provable_claims.py (25 proofs, pass/fail at release).

Claims are categorised as: mathematically verified in code (reproducible calculation), simulation-verified (ArduPilot SITL with specified scenarios), cited from named public sources (specific ISW/RUSI/CSIS reports, manufacturer datasheets with product and version, NATO STANAG 4609 Ed. 4 (motion imagery) and STANAG 4671 (UAV airworthiness) numbers), or explicitly marked CALCULATED / THEORETICAL / DESIGN GOAL. FSG-A has NO own flight hours, NO field measurements, and NO operational experience of its own.

Who This Is For

The primary audience is anyone who needs to make competent technical decisions about drone warfare and wants a reference that is specific, numerate, and honest about what is and is not yet validated. In practice this includes: engineers at Saab, BAE Systems Hägglunds, Milrem and similar integrators; staff officers at brigade level and above in Nordic and allied forces; reservists in Hemvärnet and equivalent organisations who are expected to operate drone systems but receive limited central guidance; researchers at FOI, KTH, Chalmers, LiU and allied institutions; NGOs and volunteer engineering groups supplying Ukrainian units; and journalists or policy analysts who need a technical baseline to write responsibly about drone warfare.

If a reader is none of the above but is simply curious how modern drone warfare works at the engineering level, this material is also for them. The intent is to make the field legible to any competent technical reader, not to gatekeep it behind clearance levels or vendor NDAs.

Independence

FSG-A is not affiliated with the Swedish Armed Forces, FOI, FMV, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, any NATO command structure, or any government agency. The content does not represent the doctrine or policy of any of those organisations. Analysis is informed by operational experience in Ukraine but is not endorsed by any military authority. The authors bear sole responsibility for technical accuracy.

Funding for hosting and domain registration is covered by Fischer Ventures EOOD from private funds. No public grants, defence contracts, or corporate sponsorships have been accepted. This independence is deliberate — the project exists specifically to provide a source that is not shaped by a single customer, vendor, or funder relationship.

Personnel Losses

16 people affiliated to the founder of this wiki were killed in Ukraine. 7 Swedish, 4 Finnish, 2 American, 1 Canadian, 2 Ukrainian. They held different roles — infantry, medics, logistics, drone operators. Their operational experience contributed directly and indirectly to the knowledge documented in these pages. Names are withheld for operational security and family privacy. The memorial page records their contribution.

Contact

FSG-A accepts contact only via PGP-encrypted email. See Secure Delivery for the public-key fingerprint and fetch instructions. There is no public phone number, no unencrypted email, and no contact form — this is a deliberate operational-security choice for an author who lives in a combat zone.

Related Chapters

Sources

Normative sources for this page. Publishing entity: Fischer Ventures EOOD, registered in Varna, Bulgaria, UIC 206683576 (verifiable via the Bulgarian Commercial Register at portal.registryagency.bg). License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International, canonical text at creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.

Technical baselines referenced across the wiki. ArduPilot developer documentation (ardupilot.org/dev). ROS 2 documentation (docs.ros.org). Named NATO STANAG 4609 Ed. 4 (motion imagery) and STANAG 4671 (UAV airworthiness) where applicable (4609 Ed. 4 for motion imagery metadata, 4671 for UAV airworthiness, 2022 for intelligence evaluation). Certifications referenced on the operators page are verifiable via the issuing organisations named there.