C-UAS
LOGISTICS VEHICLES

Vehicle Comparison

Why Logistics Vehicles Matter

Swedish logistics vehicles face drone threats that require tailored countermeasures. Destroying a logistics vehicle does not just eliminate one truck — it breaks the supply chain behind it. A battalion without ammunition resupply stops fighting within hours. The enemy knows this: observation drones search convoy routes because logistics vehicles move in predictable patterns on known roads. A drone that follows a convoy for 10 minutes identifies every vehicle, timetable, and rest point. Lisa 26's primary contribution to logistics vehicle defense is not the CUAV package — it is route planning. Lisa 26 L2 recommends different convoy routes each time, based on observed drone activity. The enemy cannot prepare an ambush if the road changes.

Tgb 11-24: Minimum Viable Protection

Tgb 11 through 24 share the same limitation: insufficient electrical systems for fixed jammers or radar. The package is identical across all four: acoustic sensor (€1,800) mounted on cab roof with magnetic base (no drilling), handheld jammer FSG-J3 (€800) for the driver. Total: €2,600. Detection range: 400-800m depending on drone type and wind. Jammer range: 100m (sufficient for own vehicle, not convoy). Installation: 20 minutes per vehicle.

The differentiator between these vehicles is not the CUAV package — it is their tactical role. Tgb 24 in tank transporter configuration carries a Strv 122 (€8M+). Losing the transporter immobilizes the tank. Lisa 26 can recommend Fischer 26 ISR pre-clearance along the planned route before high-value convoys depart — the ISR drone sweeps the route looking for observation drones before the convoy enters.

Tgb 30: Designed-In Protection

Tgb 30 is the newest vehicle (delivery 2025-2026) with sufficient electrical capacity and design margin for a complete package: acoustic sensor + visual camera (€2,400), FSG-J2 fixed omnidirectional jammer (€2,800, 200m radius), one interceptor in canister launcher (€350). Lisa 26 app pre-installed on vehicle tablet. Total: €5,550. Unlike Tgb 11-24 where CUAV is retrofitted with magnetic mounts, Tgb 30's package is integrated at delivery — fixed cable runs, dedicated mounting points, electrical system sized for the load.

Route Randomization — The Primary Defense

The most effective protection for logistics convoys is not electronic — it is procedural. Lisa 26 L2 generates a different route for each convoy run based on the current drone activity picture. If an enemy observation drone was detected over Route A yesterday, today's convoy uses Route B or C. If all three routes have been observed within the past 48 hours, Lisa 26 recommends delaying the convoy until Fischer 26 can verify the routes are clear of current observation.

Route randomization defeats the most common attack pattern against logistics: the enemy observes a convoy route on day 1, places mines or positions an ambush on day 2, and the convoy drives into the prepared kill zone on day 3. By never using the same route on consecutive days, the enemy's observation investment on day 1 provides no tactical advantage. The cost of route randomization is zero euros and 5-15 minutes of additional travel time per convoy. The cost of a destroyed Tgb 24 with a Strv 122 on its trailer: €8 million plus crew casualties.

← Del av Cuav Overview

External source: Terrängbil – Wikipedia

Implementation

# Lisa 26 Convoy Route Planning — Avoid Observed Routes
import random

def plan_convoy_route(origin, destination, known_drone_activity, n_routes=5):
    """Generate randomized routes avoiding known drone observation."""
    routes = generate_alternative_routes(origin, destination, n_routes)
    
    scored = []
    for route in routes:
        # Score based on drone observation risk
        risk = 0
        for segment in route.segments:
            for obs in known_drone_activity:
                if segment.distance_to(obs.position) < 2000:  # 2km observation range
                    risk += obs.confidence * obs.recency_weight
        
        scored.append((route, risk))
    
    # Select lowest-risk route (never the same as last convoy)
    scored.sort(key=lambda x: x[1])
    selected = scored[0][0]
    
    # Log for Lisa 26 COP
    return {
        "route": selected,
        "risk_score": scored[0][1],
        "alternatives_evaluated": n_routes,
        "note": "Route changes each convoy — enemy cannot predict"
    }

# Lisa 26 L2 recommends: "Route C via E45 → Rv97, risk 0.12"
# Previous convoy used Route A — different road each time

Swedish Supply Chain

Related Chapters

Sources

Swedish Armed Forces vehicle inventory (public). Ukrainian logistics C-UAS experience 2022-2026. Manufacturer specifications.