RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT

Authorization Matrix — Engagement Rules

Escalation Principle

The rule is simple: the more lethal and irreversible the action, the higher the required authority. Destroying a vehicle (replaceable equipment) requires platoon commander. Engaging personnel (irreversible) requires company commander. Reallocating drones between companies (affects multiple units) requires battalion commander. Coordinating between battalions requires brigade staff. The only exception to the escalation chain is time-critical air defense (L3), where physics does not allow time for escalation.

L3 Hard Constraints

Lisa 26 L3 autonomous engagement is architecturally restricted to air-to-air interceptor launch. The code cannot generate a ground attack command in L3 mode. This is not a parameter that can be changed in a configuration file — it is a structural constraint in the engagement logic. Three conditions must be met simultaneously: target classified as DRONE (not vehicle, not person), inbound velocity vector to friendly position, confidence exceeding 85%. All three are evaluated by independent code paths with no shared failure mode.

Decision Authority by Target Type

The fundamental ROE principle for drone operations: the lethality of the decision determines the level of authority required to approve it. L1 (inform): any AI detection is automatically displayed on all COP terminals. No human approval needed — this is pure information sharing. L2 vehicle engagement: the platoon commander approves based on visual confirmation via Fischer 26 video feed. The commander can see the target, assess context (is it near civilian structures? is it moving toward or away from friendly positions?), and make an informed decision in 30-120 seconds.

L2 personnel engagement: the company commander approves. Higher authority required because the risk of misidentification is greater — a thermal signature that AI classifies as "person" could be a combatant, a civilian, or even a thermal decoy. The company commander has broader situational awareness (S2 intelligence about enemy presence in the area, reports from adjacent units) that the platoon commander may lack. This additional context reduces the probability of engaging a non-combatant.

Pre-Mission ROE Delegation

Before each mission, the company commander can delegate specific ROE authorities to the platoon level. Example: "All vehicles in sector 3 between grid lines 45 and 47 are pre-approved for platoon-level engagement. Personnel engagement still requires company approval." This delegation compresses the kill chain for vehicle targets from 3-5 minutes (waiting for company-level radio approval) to 30-60 seconds (platoon commander approves on the spot). The delegation is specific to a sector, timeframe, and target type — it expires at mission end and must be re-issued for the next mission.

The delegation must be documented in the mission order and understood by all drone team leaders. Ambiguity in ROE delegation has caused both fratricide (engaging too quickly without verification) and missed opportunities (hesitating because authority was unclear). The Lisa 26 tablet can display the current ROE authorization level for each sector — green sectors allow platoon-level vehicle engagement, yellow sectors require company approval for all targets. This visual display reduces confusion under stress.

Rules of engagement for drone operations represent the single most important document in the mission order. Ambiguous engagement rules produce either hesitation (missed targets) or premature action (fratricide and civilian casualties). Clear engagement authority — who can approve what, against which target type, in which sector — eliminates the hesitation that costs time and the ambiguity that costs lives.

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Sources

Normative sources. International Humanitarian Law (Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I). ICRC recommendations on autonomous weapons systems. NATO ROE framework (MC 362). Medical transport protection — Article 12 of the First Geneva Convention. Protection of civilian infrastructure — Article 52 of Additional Protocol I.

Architectural constraints (not parameters). The L3 hard constraints — "air-to-air interceptor only", "target classified as DRONE", "confidence exceeding 85%" — are implemented as code, not configuration. These constraints live in independent code paths with no shared failure mode. Blocking of prohibited categories (medical transport, civilian infrastructure) is in the logic itself, before recommendations reach the commander's tablet. These are structural properties of the system, not policies that can be overridden.

Operational estimates — not validated by field testing. Timeframes in the authority matrix (2–5 minutes for vehicle strike, 5–15 minutes for personnel strike, <10 s for interceptor) are FSG-A design goals based on typical command cycles, not measured in combat operations. The "30–120 seconds" commander situation-assessment times are estimates based on published military command-process analysis. Kill-chain compression from 3–5 min to 30–60 s through delegation is a theoretical model, not confirmed in field exercises.

External standards and references. NATO ROE frameworks. Swedish Armed Forces published doctrine (public). Public reports on Ukrainian ROE practices 2022–2025 (RUSI Watling & Reynolds (2023) and ISW archive). Lisa 26 brigade architecture v2.0. FSG-A has no operational ROE — the framework is conceptual but grounded in published normative documents.