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FSG-A // MISSION // IDEA-SPREADER FROM UKRAINE

OUR MISSION
IDEA-SPREADER FROM UKRAINE TO SWEDEN

Author: FSG-A — CC BY-SA 4.0

COMPLETE MISSION 2026-04-16

KEY TAKEAWAY

FSG-A Fjärrstridsgrupp Alfa is a group of Swedish nationals who since 2022 have served in Ukrainian military units (12th SPB Azov Unit 3057, 3rd SSO Medevac, and other units). We have observed the rapid development of drone warfare up close. Our mission is NOT to become a company or sell products — it is to be an idea-spreader: to transfer tactics, technology and lessons learned from the real drone war in Ukraine to Sweden, so that Swedish Armed Forces, FMV, FOI, Home Guard, and our allies do not fall behind. We publish everything under CC BY-SA 4.0 — free to copy, modify, and distribute. We have no sales department, no contracts, no shareholders. Just competence and a desire for Sweden to be ready.

Who we are

FSG-A consists of Swedish nationals who voluntarily contracted with fighting units in Ukraine since 2022. Our knowledge does not come from simulators or whitepapers — it comes from having sat in foxholes with a RadioMaster TX16S in hand, from having watched FPV drones fly toward targets that shoot back, from having lost 16 colleagues (7 Swedes, 4 Finns, 2 Americans, 1 Canadian, 2 Ukrainians) whom FSG-A's founder knew personally.

What we write is not hypothesis. It is lessons written in blood — but not our own blood to boast about, rather our colleagues' blood to honor by ensuring that their lessons do not disappear.

What "idea-spreader" means

An idea-spreader (the concept comes from medical equipment that injects under pressure) is a concentrated transfer of knowledge from one reality to another. Our mission in three points:

TRANSFER: Lessons from Ukrainian front lines to Swedish units, agencies, researchers, and industry
OPEN: All knowledge published openly under CC BY-SA 4.0 — no patents, no vendor lock-in, no secrecy
INNOVATE: Combine Ukrainian operational practice with Swedish engineering quality and Norrbotten's arctic conditions for solutions that do not exist anywhere else

Why this is needed NOW

Sweden risks falling behind

The Russian drone threat to Sweden is not hypothetical — it is operational today. Meanwhile, Swedish defense industry and doctrine have been built on 2010s drone thinking: large platforms, long development cycles, contract-bound ecosystems. The drone war in Ukraine shows that paradigm is obsolete. Iteration occurs in weeks, not years. Cheap drones defeat expensive systems. Open source beats proprietary technology through speed. If Sweden is to survive the next decade, we must adopt this mindset immediately — not in 5 years when FMV's next procurement cycle is done.

The drone war's iteration pace

In Ukraine, operational parameters change every week. An EW countermeasure that works on Monday is obsolete on Friday. This creates an innovation pace where a six-month development cycle is a lifetime. Swedish traditional procurement (24-36 months from need to delivery) is structurally incapable of keeping up. Our idea-spreader is designed to bypass this: publish architecture and code openly so that Swedish Armed Forces, FMV, FOI, or private contractors can adopt parts in days — not years.

What we specifically contribute

1. Operational lessons from actual use

We have seen which drone tactics work against Russian armor (top-attack 70°+ dive angle), which EW countermeasures actually work (fiber-optic FPV during total RF denial), which communication protocols survive in combat (Silvus MANET over traditional VHF links), and which do not. These lessons are not published in Western defense journals — they live in Ukrainian operators' oral tradition and in internal AAR documents. We translate them into open public documentation.

2. Technical architecture integrating Ukrainian tactics with Swedish engineering

Lisa 26 (our decision engine) and Fischer 26 (our ISR/EW drone) are not just Ukrainian systems rebranded for Sweden. They are designed from the ground up to combine Ukrainian operational practice with specific Swedish conditions: arctic environment in Norrbotten, Swedish Armed Forces STANAG 2022 information evaluation, integration with FMV SLB and TAK Server, compatibility with Saab weapon systems like AT4, NLAW, and Carl Gustaf M4.

3. Open source that breaks dependency on foreign suppliers

All code is published under CC BY-SA 4.0. That means the Home Guard can adopt Lisa 26 without buying a license. FMV can modify Fischer 26's EW system without asking permission. FOI can build on the beamforming mathematics without export restrictions. Private Swedish startups can build products on top of the architecture and sell them to the Armed Forces without paying royalties to us. We create a knowledge commons upon which Sweden can build its own drone industry.

4. Mathematically proven claims that can be audited

We publish executable code that proves every numerical claim (see Mathematically Proven Claims). No "trust us" culture. Swedish Armed Forces can run our self-tests and verify the mathematics themselves. This is the engineering standard that defense industry deserves but rarely gets.

What we are NOT

To avoid misunderstandings: FSG-A is explicitly NOT the following:

Not a company: We have no sales department, no marketing, no contracts, no shareholders
Not part of the Armed Forces: We represent ourselves, not the Swedish state or any agency
Not a lobby organization: We do not try to influence political decisions, we only provide technical input
Not a consulting firm: We do not sell services. Everything we publish is free
Not a military contractor: We do not train soldiers, run operations, or supply personnel
Not a research institute: We do not do basic research, we systematize operational lessons
Not a pro-war voice: Our goal is to prevent war in Sweden by making deterrence credible

Legally, Fischer Ventures EOOD (registered in Varna, Bulgaria, UIC 206683576) is the entity that publishes the material because some legal entity must exist for CC BY-SA 4.0 licensing. But no commerce occurs through this company. It is an administrative formality, not a business operation.

What we hope to achieve

Short term (12 months)

That at least one Swedish agency (FMV, FOI, Home Guard) builds a physical prototype of Fischer 26
That at least one Swedish entrepreneur commercializes a Lisa 26-based solution
That at least one Swedish university (KTH, LiU, LTU) adopts our architecture in a course or master's thesis
That Swedish Armed Forces at least evaluates the concept in an exercise

Medium term (3-5 years)

That Swedish drone industry establishes itself with products built on top of our open architecture
That Home Guard has concrete drone capability built on Lisa 26 principles
That Swedish engineering students are educated in the reality of drone warfare, not outdated platform thinking
That Norrbotten regiment and other arctic units have fully developed arctic drone systems

Long term (10+ years)

That Sweden is a European leader in autonomous combat systems rather than an importer of foreign technology
That Swedish drone knowledge is exported to Ukraine and other allied nations
That FSG-A as an organization can be dissolved because we are no longer needed — our task is to make ourselves redundant

Why we do not sell

We could start a company. We could seek investment. We could patent. We choose not to do this for several reasons:

Geopolitically: If FSG-A becomes a company, we create a dependency point. If we get acquired or shut down, the knowledge disappears. Open source is indestructible — it lives on even when we are gone.

Time-wise: Building a company takes 2-5 years before it is operational. Sweden does not have that time. The knowledge must be transferred now, not when we have built a sales organization.

Ethically: Our colleagues died to prevent free knowledge from being suffocated by geopolitics. To then turn around and sell their lessons contradicts the root reason we are here.

Strategically: A Sweden with an active open drone development commons becomes stronger than a Sweden dependent on a single supplier — including ourselves. We optimize for Sweden's strength, not for FSG-A's survival.

How Swedish Armed Forces, FMV, and others can use this

We offer no support, no consulting hours, no meetings. What we offer is the following:

Complete architecture documentation — 337 wiki pages in three languages (Swedish, English, Ukrainian)
Executable code — approximately 5,500 lines of Python implementing every concept
Integration SDK — eight extension points so you can adapt to your own systems (radio, C2, whitelist, payloads, etc.)
Mathematically proven claims — 15 numerical claims verifiable with self-tests
Honesty validators — automatic tools that ensure the documentation does not exaggerate or lie
Brutally honest validation status — exact list of what is proven versus what is architecture proposal

Pick up what you need. Modify it. Publish your improvements (or not — CC BY-SA 4.0 only requires that your modifications also be free). Do not contact us for support — the documentation is complete and self-service oriented precisely so that you do not need us.

A special appeal to the Swedish technology sector

You who work at Saab, Ericsson, FMV, FOI, Swedish defense technology startups: take what we have published and make it reality. We have given you the architecture. You have the engineering resources, quality control, and production capacity that we lack. You can build Fischer 26 prototypes in weeks. You can train YOLOv8 models on Swedish military vehicles. You can manufacture CRPA antennas with your existing production flows. You can do this — we can only describe how.

Swedish Armed Forces and FMV: start a formal evaluation. Build two prototypes. Test in Norrbotten. If something works — adopt. If something does not work — tell us and we correct the documentation. No feedback is lost.

Home Guard: you have the flexibility that the regular forces lack. Pick up Lisa 26 on an Android tablet for 800 euros. Build a communication node in a Pelican case. Start training your platoons in the reality of drone warfare instead of simulated armored combat that no longer reflects today's battlefield.

In memory of our colleagues

Sixteen people in FSG-A's founder's close circle have died in Ukraine since 2022. Seven Swedes. Four Finns. Two Americans. One Canadian. Two Ukrainians. Their names will be published when surviving families have given their approval. This wiki is their continued impact — every Swedish soldier who learns from our lessons is a victory for what they sacrificed.

If this knowledge saves a single Swedish soldier in a future conflict, their death will not have been in vain.

License and use

Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International. Copy freely. Modify freely. Distribute freely. Credit FSG-A Fjärrstridsgrupp Alfa as original source. Modified versions shared under the same license. Commercial use permitted. No royalties. No patents. No vendor lock-in.

The Swedish state, Swedish Armed Forces, FMV, FOI, Home Guard, Swedish defense industry, Swedish universities, and all allied nations can freely adopt everything we have published without contacting us, without asking permission, without paying. To do something useful with our knowledge is the highest gratitude.

OUR MISSIONIDEA-SPREADER FROM UKRAINE TO SWEDEN